Wage Slavery

3,500 words

One of the objectives of this blog is to highlight the value-shift that occurs when we finally accept the fact that we live in a material universe. Fundamentally, that means eliminating the toxic residue of the Platonic paradigm that remains embedded in our social structures and value judgments.

This post is the third in a series on work. It ventures into the realm occupied by economic systems, and by implication the political structures necessary to support them. If it seems radical, it’s only because of the great distance we have drifted from an acceptance of our nature as material organisms. It lays out principles of practice derived from the premises established in two posts of July of this year: “Work,” posted July 1st and “Work in a Material Universe,” posted July 14th. I hope you can read them as a whole.

I want to start by making series of propositions.

(1) The economic systems of all modern complex western societies are based on what is aptly called wage slavery.   Wage slavery is a version of the master slave relationship. Wage slavery is not a metaphor. It is slavery. People may no longer be owned as persons, but as workers they are not free. Their work is owned by someone else.

(2) All remunerated labor tends to be servile. Money paid for labor is most often equated to the purchase of non-human objects or products. Such use considers what is bought to be then owned by the buyer. The buyer in effect becomes “God” with the right to annihilate or abuse the object purchased as he sees fit. He artificially individualizes the worker by treating his labor as an object owned, extracting him from the natural survival community and its instinctive cooperative collaboration.

But human work cannot be owned by another. Labor cannot be alienated from its author and his community because it is the expression of the conatus the resident energy that imposes the obligation to continue to exist on the individual material organism in its social matrix. Work is and always remains the output of the worker’s personal survival drive in collaboration with his natural community.

Analogous to the deferential way professionals are treated in western society, an individual’s labor can only be compensated for. Payment (in money or kind) can only be the attempt to counterbalance the temporary (and voluntary) deflection of the worker’s own life energy to the survival interests of someone outside of his natural community. To claim that labor can be bought and owned by the employer is fiction; it is metaphysically impossible. To force it is enslavement; it will fatally distort the humanity and relationships of the people involved in the attempted transaction.

Notice that professionals are treated differently. They are also remunerated, but because of the high value placed on mental as opposed to physical activity in the Platonic worldview, no one considers that in paying a professional, like a doctor, that he becomes your employee and must obey your orders. You compensate him for his creative initiative on your behalf. That should be the paradigm for all labor output from all human beings.

(3) Wage slavery is culturally conditioned by two things: the mythic significance of money and the perennial existence of officially approved master-slave relationships in our western “Christian” societies.


The fundamental division of labor is between masters and slaves. Slavery in western society originated in pre-Christian Mediterranean culture, which in turn inherited it from the earlier civilizations of the fertile crescent, Mesopotamia and Egypt. Modern wage slavery is grounded in the ownership of labor. It is the recapitulation in commercial, contractual terms of the slavery characteristic of the ancient world and its Christianized continuation in mediaeval serfdom, indentured servitude, penal and other forms of impressed service.

The oldest form of slavery was ethnic; it was maintained by the conquest and control of people identified as “alien” and, since one’s own tribe, culture and language was assumed to be the only fully human version of humanity, conquered aliens were necessarily considered less than human and therefore similar to the animals that humans used for work, sport or pleasure.

Ancient slavery shed its ethnic roots and was given a universal and specifically spiritual justification by Platonism as the care and guidance of the less-than-human. From the time of the ascendancy of Christianity in the Mediterranean world beginning in the third century, all cultural entities, including the institution of slavery, so essential to the ancient economies, came to be evaluated and universally justified under the aegis of Platonic categories which Christianity embraced, “baptized” and carried forward. It is important to realize that, like imperial autocratic power itself to which slavery is the categorical counterpart, slavery was never repudiated by Christianity in the ancient world.

The principal Platonic tenet that was used to justify slavery was also embraced by Christianity and placed at the center of its world-view, despite the fact that Jesus never endorsed it. It was the concept of the “spiritual soul,” defined as a rational mind, separable from the body, believed to be the person itself, naturally immortal, destined to be judged at death. The soul was an immaterial substance opposed to matter and the material body’s fundamental nature as “animal,” or “carnal” and mortal.

Body and soul, constructed of diametrically opposed “substances,” matter and spirit, were mutually inimical. The spiritual soul, and by extension “spiritual people” (whose lives were relatively free of bodily domination), were considered fully human. Professors, teachers, landowners, administrators, magistrates, senators, merchants and bankers, religious elite, military commanders, etc., people who lived by the work of others and confined their activity to labor of the mind, were in this class. Slaves who lived by the work of their hands and body were deemed less than fully human — their souls were crippled by bodies which were physically controlled by others when not dehumanized by their own animal urges and survival needs. Slaves required having a master to control them, guide their daily activities and determine what they should accomplish with their lives. Slaves, women and children were the first constituents of the primary division of labor: between master and slave. Platonism gave it philosophical form: it said the division was between the fully human and the sub-human — those that worked with their mind, and those that worked with their hands.

Platonism attributed a spiritual dimension to the male body and an excess of material density to the female which supposedly accounted for what men called “women’s erratic behavior.” Thus the domination of the husband over his wife — already well-established as a function of paternal ownership — was re-presented under Platonic Christianity as a replay of the need for the mind to control the body … for spirit to dominate the flesh.

The father/owner/slave master, far from being identified as oppressor in this view, was re-conceived as protector, and it was as protectors that Christianity imposed moral obligations on the slaveholders: they were not to mistreat their slaves. But at no point did Christianity condemn slavery as an institution, or insist on the parity of the partners in marriage, or defend the full humanity of slaves, or require that masters refrain from disciplining them in any way they saw fit. These norms and standards were also applied to the father’s control of his family.

This same thinking was used to justify mediaeval serfdom and the 16th century conquest and enslavement of primitive peoples in Africa, Asia and the Americas.   The supporters of slavery quoted Aristotle directly. It was all done under the aegis of a slavery-tolerant Christianity.  Christians have universally tolerated or justified slavery in one form or another in every epoch and in every place they gained ascendancy. There is evidence that even the monasteries used slave labor.

The paternal family in the west is an integral part of this picture and is both the source and the result of the Platonic-justified master-slave relationship. That an adult gives commands, and children obey, is a necessary and unavoidable practicality because adults are more knowledgeable than children. But that the right and obligation to command whether the authority has superior knowledge or not, and the moral duty to obey even though the subject knows more than the authority, claimed as justification for coercing obedience to the proprietary male from women, children and servants, deemed carnal, inferior and needing control, is an arbitrary cultural value choice, imposed for the internalization of the master-slave system. Fathers were owners of their wives and children, every bit as much as of their slaves. That convention has been justified by Platonic Christianity as a spiritual function since its birth in the ancient Mediterranean world.

Based on the value placed on mental as opposed to bodily energies in the Platonic system, the educational patterns in western society imitate and in turn reinforce the master-slave relationship by preparing students to accept the primacy of rational thought over any other human activity. Educational practices and goals are dominated by the values prioritized under the Platonic paradigm: respect for and obedience to the spiritual superior. Rationality, exemplified as mental operations ruled by logic and mathematics, was the standard of highest value set for the student. Feelings — internally experienced forces that have been traditionally ascribed to the body — were excluded as less-than-human; manual work, it goes without saying, was demeaned as subhuman; they were all to be eliminated, or at least suppressed and controlled. Historic movements of awakening — 12th century humanism, 15th century renaissance, 19th century romanticism, 20th century post-modernism — were all attempts to reassert the rights of the integral human organism against the tyranny of the Platonic exaltation of the mind over the body

Professionals in our culture are those who live by mental activity, not physical. Students are taught that professionals are a “higher” version of human being. Education prepares the educated to accept the “natural right” of mental over physical labor and therefore the control of the commanding manager who thinks, over the toiling worker who supposedly does not. In reality, it is a fiction that disguises the fundamental myths: the myths of the disembodied mind and its ownership of all things material, including “material” people..

In Plato’s world, the body does not think, only the soul thinks. The Platonic prejudice is so powerful that despite the fact that the ideal of pure rational cerebration is almost never realized, giving clear indication of the delusional nature of the belief, it has not mitigated in the least the supreme value placed on it in our dualist culture. It has justified the existence of a master class as superior thinking human beings. It encourages its devotees to denigrate and dismiss contributions to human discourse and decision-making that fall short of that ideal. It means that the uneducated, i.e., those who by definition have never been thoroughly indoctrinated in the cerebral illusion by certified “masters” during an extended period of mental submission, are pre-emptively excluded from the gatherings where directions are chosen and the means of achieving goals determined. It means the worker has no input. It divides society along educational-intellectual lines and consigns the uneducated to lives of obedient physical reflex, either entirely devoid of a rational dimension or where the rational element, which has already been determined by the educated elite, is to be applied without revision or deviation.

From this short description it should be clear that most “jobs” — what people mistakenly call work — fall into this category. Jobs, for the most part, are slave labor based on the Platonic scheme of values. From society’s perspective wage slavery is not only arbitrary and unnecessary but it is inefficient and wasteful of the creativity of those who are employed. Moreover, it risks generating sociopathic blowback for, from the worker’s perspective, it is dehumanizing.

Wage slavery tends to reduce “owned” labor to a mechanical reflex, and thus has encouraged the adoption of the “assembly-line” factory system, operational world-wide at this point in time, premised on the mind-numbing repetition of some minor procedure, as the ideal (most efficient) form of labor. But workers also think and can plan the desired outcome of community endeavors; such is their predisposition as living organisms. Their exclusion from that process is a profound injustice endorsed by the Platonic delusion. Money cannot compensate for the loss of participatory autonomy. Work is a survival function of the human organism; we are innately determined by it.

The key valence and infallible indicator of the presence of the master-slave relationship is absolute obedience on the part of the isolated individual worker whose instinct to collaborate creatively with companions in the work effort is totally frustrated. The worker is under orders to make no input of his own into the task at hand. For the successful completion of a project he is to relate to the employer alone, not to his work companions.

The ancient monks saw very clearly the power of obedience to stifle the self — in their case what they believed was a false self — and replace it with what they believed to be their “true self.” The slaveholder is equally intent on suppressing any self in the worker that would compete with his own goals. Hence he requires absolute obedience from individuals isolated from their natural community because he has bought and thinks he owns their labor. The monk used obedience as a tool to achieve his own chosen goals, one of which was the formation of a brotherhood. The isolated jobholder, however, knows very well that the only goals of his own or of his community that he will ever achieve through his job will be those he wrests from his employer by force.


Money prevents workers from exercising control on two counts. The first is the myth that a private person can actually own (with the right of annihilation) the means of production of goods and services that are used and needed by the whole community. This is patently impossible.  At most the community may consign management to a private entity, but it cannot allow its survival to be held hostage to private concerns. It is a logical tautology because the “private” person survives only in and through the survival of the community.

The second myth is that employers can buy and therefore own the labor of their individual workers. Both myths are based on the more fundamental belief that money gives ownership with divine rights over what is owned.

The Latin language, which has been the source of so many helpful distinctions in our thinking, in this case does not distinguish between owner and master: the same word, dominus, is used for both. Similarly, ownership and political power have only one word: dominium.

Historians surmise that trade began with barter: the use of equivalent values for items that each trader needed. Then it seems likely that some highly desirable object became the standard of calculation. Precious metals lent themselves to being such a standard because of their association with the gods and immortality. In Egypt, gold, which was associated with the sun god, Ra, because of its yellow brilliance, was calculated at 12 times the value of silver which was thought to capture the pale light of the moon. To participate in such divine power was everyone’s desire.[1]

Money is believed to give ownership to the buyer. Even the customer momentarily becomes “master” over the corporate giant that sells the product in question because money has exchanged hands. The “customer is always right” is the acknowledgement of the supreme power that money is given in our culture.

Survival in a complex society requires money. When money is the exclusive form of compensation for every kind of labor, even the most meaningless (or dehumanizing) task can earn one his living. “Jobs” that are paid for with money pretend to own the energy immanent in the artificially individualized worker. Employment pretends to redirect that energy toward ends that may have nothing whatsoever to do with the survival needs of the worker and his community and claim that the deflection is fully justified by money.

There are no differences in the recognition provided by money except through quantity. Hence the volume of money alone becomes an index of value. This equation is so ironclad that even those who are aware of its falsifying potential are unable to extricate themselves from its illusions: everyone defers to those who have a lot of money. Many silently harbor beliefs that the rich are superior: smarter, more disciplined, more moral and “blessed” by God. The myth is reinforced by traditional religion that ascribes to divine providence the actual state of affairs in human society. If someone is wealthy, it’s because “God” willed it. The fact that this is obviously preposterous should be enough to put an end to these illusions. There is no such providence.

This blurring is especially damaging to the economic programming that these reflections are suggesting: that we can re-structure the division of labor and remuneration in such a way as to guarantee that each individual is included in the collaborative effort to survive and through that participation achieves survival and a place in society.

The first element in any analysis of how work and reward should be distributed is clarifying the distinction between survival work and other human endeavors that are directed toward the quest for life that transcends the moment, many of which are of dubious value. The second is to insure that the worker’s efforts are respected for their double significance: work achieves organismic survival in a community that acknowledges the human instinct to transcendence through social membership. The collaborative participation of the worker expresses the communitarian character that matter’s energy has used as a survival tool over and over again during the course of 14 billion years of evolutionary development. The natural human instinct is to work with known companions as part of a collaborative endeavor.

Worker Justice

From all that has been said it should clear that the exclusive focus on “bread and butter” issues (salaries, benefits and working conditions) when addressing the question of justice for working people, omits the most important: collaboration and worker control. It assumes that the worker is an isolated individual whose labor can be redirected by the master who owns it. In a material universe that is committed to eliminating the toxic residue of the Platonic paradigm, the primary injustice is identified as the isolation of the individual worker and his alienation from his work — the claim to own the labor of another human being. The fundamental injury is the institutionalized frustration of the need of the human organism, embedded in its community of survival, to express its intrinsic and constitutive existential bearing in its work. It is the refusal to permit the collaborative, intelligent, autonomous participation of socialized human organisms in the communal decisions and collective labor that determine not only what work will be done but also all the associated conditions that impact the project and the workers.

Wages and benefits are not the be all and end all for working people that many labor organizations claim. In their haste to be part of the prevailing economic system and to avoid alternatives prejudicially labeled “socialist,” labor unions end up collaborating with management in the maintenance of the mindlessness and isolation of wage slavery. Worker collaboration, input and control is never part of any contract package, and it is not even part of labor unions’ declared mission statement. Workers who become union members do not join a brotherhood; each isolated individual worker performs only one collective action: he votes with other isolated individuals to hire a corporate lawyer who will defend his rights as an individual worker.

Justice for working people will never be secured until the issue of collaborative human participation is acknowledged as an essential part of any and all human endeavors, including the jobs protected by labor unions.   Human work must be the act of fully engaged human organisms, body and soul, mind and spirit. None of this can be “owned” by another.


The enormous gap between these principles of practice and the actual state of affairs in our economic system is so great that many will dismiss this vision as quixotic. But don’t be fooled. These proposals are not some new utopian innovation. They address a massive historical deformity that we have inherited from our dualist tradition: the human organism has been trapped in an ongoing cultural fiction that has destroyed its integrity in the service of exploitation by the master class. We have been living with wage slavery for more than two centuries. The consequences for working people have been catastrophic. It’s time we put an end to this mockery of the human being.

We fail to implement the reform of this system at our peril as humans. That doesn’t mean that society faces imminent collapse or that armed insurrection is inevitable. Things may very well go on just the way they are. But the human destruction to working class individuals and to community at the level of family and neighborhood will continue unabated and even intensified. It will continue the propagation of individual and social pathologies of genocidal proportions, an effect that we have been living with among the working class in our cities since the early 19th century. To change the situation a transition from the patterns that now dominate wage slavery will require a complete overhaul of the way work is planned from the very beginning.

Such a change would be a “revolution.”

[1] Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death, Wesleyan U. Press, 1959, p. 234 ff.


3,000 words

Some might be surprised that Benedict’s Rule placed such emphasis on obedience, because the activity most often associated with the monastery is work. The thumbnail summary of the Rule, Ora et labora, seemed to confirm that observation. “Pray and work” was a Benedictine motto written on the gates to their land and the entrances to their buildings.

But on second look, work and obedience are very similar. Work demands humility and discipline. It establishes an outside criterion for action, an objective standard to which you have to bend your will if you are going to accomplish what you intend. Also, the command from the monastic superior often took the form of a work order, so the challenge to self-will was doubled: you had to obey the abbot, and you had to subject yourself to the requirements of the task. From the earliest days in the deserts of Egypt, anchorites seeking to conform themselves to “God” used work as their routine pratice. Work, like obedience, was a primary tool for unmasking and emasculating the false self — the egoic self that believes it has no Creator and Matrix but itself — and replacing it with the true Self.   Theosis.

Work in a Universe of Spirit

But the understanding of reality determined by modern science has radically changed the context in which work is defined. For thousands of years and right up into our times we had been convinced by ancient scientists that reality was characterized by ideas that emanated from a divine Spirit-Mind capable of creating an entire cosmos for the purposes embedded in those ideas. This had a major effect on our understanding of the place of work in human life and society.

The principal creative activity in such a cosmos was not physical effort but the emanation of mind — ideas, thinking, also called contemplation. It could hardly be called work. It was an effortless, almost passive event, where mind and its ideas accounted for the form that reality assumed, going and coming. A divine Mind generated the ideas that a subordinate, created, god-like “Craftsman” (Logos) implanted in matter. A human mind then reads the ideas that had been placed in the material “receptacle” and understands them. This was Plato’s theory and it was accepted as settled science by the educated class throughout the Greco-Roman world. When the uppser classes took over Christianity in the second century Plato came along with them.

Matter, in this conceptualization, is a passive partner whose role, like that of an empty bowl, was calculated in terms of the amount of emptiness (potential) it brought to the creative moment. Matter was entirely eclipsed by the creative power of the ideas that are responsible for the form that things have as existing entities.

In that world whatever existed did so only because it was in possession of form. Matter conferred no reality whatsoever. Existence came only through the form, the essence, the idea.

Spiritist monism. Even aside from Plato’s imaginative projection of another world where ideas like “justice” had substantial existence, by making idea the sole source of existence in this world, he reduced matter to a kind of non-being, a foil for the perfection of spirit at best, when not disdained as hostile to the rational goals of the universe. Dualism at first sight appears to admit a certain parity between metaphysical principles, matter and form, and Aristotle tried to establish exactly that. But it didn’t stick because it simply wasn’t true … the only reality in that universe was spirit and its ideas. Matter was not fully real; without form matter could not exist, whereas forms, like Plato’s substantial ideas, the idea of “being” and the human soul, could and did exist without matter, and his “World of Ideas” (later the “Mind of God”) was popuated exclusively by these real “essences.” Dualism is a misnomer. Platonism was a spiritist (idealist) monism where positive form was thought to overcome a negative matter that was hostile to existence. Matter was alien, destructive and corrupting. If something existed it was because form was able to dominate and neutralize matter’s negativity.

The body. Those premises have had a disintegrating effect when applied to the world of man in society. First, it divided the individual human organism in two, body and soul … and granted all life and reality to the soul, even to the point of imagining it could exist without the body.   It exalted rational cerebration and emotional distance over a respect for organismic wholeness — feelings, emotions, urges, instincts, needs, originating in the body. It identified matter as the source of all corruption, irrationality, sin, sickness and death. The body was denigrated as a source of uncontrollable deflection from the soul’s pursuit of rational goals … in personal morality, in interpersonal relationships, in all manner of human endeavors and in politics. The body was corrupt flesh whose appetites it shared with the animals. Disdain for the body was axiomatic. This vision was responsible for a generalized cultural pathology I have called “autogenic disease,” a sickness unique to the human species where the individual identifies its own body as alien, hostile, and tries to destroy it.

The concrete task, therefore, of the “lovers of wisdom” in the Platonic universe was to find ways to control, suppress, ignore, even eliminate the body as a factor in the destiny of the human individual, or at least to reduce its damaging effects to a minimum. The goal was the liberation of spirit from matter. Matter was to be discarded … and death itself was adduced as a confirmation of that. At death our spirits (“souls”), freed from matter as from a dungeon, returned to the world where they originated, the world of spirit, the real world.   All ascesis was developed to assist in the liberation of the spirit from the body made of matter, and the process of applying them was called, aptly, spirituality.

Work. It almost goes without saying that in such a universe, workphysical, bodily labor — would be looked on as humanly demeaning, the effect of the fall of humanity from spiritual immortality into subjection to the disintegration, decay and corruption characteristic of all matter and by inclusion, the human body. This was exactly the interpretation that Augustine and the Romanized Western Christian Church imposed on the Genesis account of the sin of Adam and Eve, where manual labor was labeled as a punishment. The need for physical labor to secure human survival was seen as a permanent scar on the human race, a sign of our shame, and a reminder that our very bodies are the twisted versions of what they should have been before being abandoned to domination by their material side.

The desert hermits, starting from these very same premises, took work and applied it to their pursuit of humility. Since work was the most demeaning activity imaginable, they embraced it, much as they embraced obedience, for its power to neutralize the false self, born of an existential insecurity that spawned a grasping neediness, self-protective pride, self-exalting abasement of others. They turned work into a tool of humility and a proclamation of their rootedness in Being in a sustained effort to allow their real Self to emerge — the Self that knows itself to be an emanation and part of existence itself and therefore radically secure. And, because they were working out of Platonic philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality, work also provided a way to challenge the body’s un-natural inclination to avoid exertion, seek comfort, ease and leisure, disobeying the demands of spiritual reason. Work, as a training ground for the spirit gaining domination over the body, was a tool of liberation from the addicting, enslaving laziness and self-gratification that ruled the flesh.

Arbeit Macht Frei. In a most grotesque caricature of this classic monastic view of work, the Nazis used the infamous phrase, arbeit macht frei, welded in steel onto the gates of a number of their concentration camps; it means “Work makes you free.” Some claim that the fact that it is also found on the gate to the death camp at Auschwitz was simply an unconscious extension from its primary use in the first camps of the early thirties where good work performance could actually earn you freedom. Regardless, what we have in the Nazi motto is an iteration of the ancient dualist attitude toward work: that because it represents a conquest over laziness and self-indulgence, work liberates the spirit and re-establishes the reasoning mind’s domination over the flesh. Did the Nazis intend the hideous irony that death itself frees the “soul” from the body and can be considered a liberation like work? Was mass extermination actually some twisted expression of the Platonic paradigm? It is just as conceivable that it was the creation of a sadistic cretin as an unconscious bureaucratic oversight. Whatever else it was, it was the re-application of the classic Western dualism regarding the human organism.   It was an atitude toward work that reflected the false premises that molded our culture.

Slavery. Then, in a further step, in a world whose economy for thousands of years into the past had been based on slave labor, the spirit-flesh duality was called on to explain and justify slavery and the military conquests required to maintain a continual supply of free labor. Even as untraditional a thinker as Aristotle was held in thrall by the rationale of the matter-spirit divide. He said that slaves were more carnal, less spiritual than their masters. They were therefore less rational, and like little children, required the guidance and direction of their superiors. Slavery, therefore, was natural it was both just and necessary.

What made the masters superior, of course, was their greater degree of immateriality. They were wealthier, less needy, less animal, more detached from the demands of the body and therefore more rational, more spiritual, more human than the slaves. Such thinking was also open to racist interpretations. Aristotle’s arguments were employed to devastating effect two thousand years later when the issue of the “humanity” of the indigenous people of the Americas was debated before Phillip II of Spain. Bartolomé de las Casas contended at court with representatives of the plantation owners of New Spain, the beneficiaries of the free labor provided by the encomienda system of Church sponsored slavery.   Witnesses said that De las Casas in fact won the debate, but the king was hostage to other considerations. The results were never made public, but the recently promulgated “New Laws” derogating the encomienda system were quietly rescinded. The implication was that by Aristotle’s standards native Americans were racially sub-human. Aristotle had provided the justification for encomienda to remain in place into the 18th century. Slavery and the new-born Africa-to-America slave trade had received a validation that would postpone its abolition for hundreds of years. “Heathen” required the work training provided by “Christian” masters in order to overcome the bestiality incurred from centuries of enslavement to Satan and the flesh. Thus was racism born as the result of the distorted application of religious doctrine.

Attitudes of pro-slavery supporters at the time of the American Civil War were bolstered by contemporary scientific ethnology which identified “inferior” races destined to die off unless they had the protection and security offered by American style slavery.[1]

The family. Consistent with its import in other areas, spiritism has had a divisive influence on the human family in the West.   Women’s inferior status in society, already well established long before the Platonic era, was given a deep, almost religious corroboration by Platonism. Women were assimilated to the body and matter, and men to mind and spirit. Women were seen as chained to chidbearing and child rearing by the female body and its inescapable cycles, while both before and after the generative act, nature left men free for other pursuits. Similar to its validation of slavery, dualism justified the exploitation of women by men as another example of spirit’s natural superiority over matter, and the need to keep the body under control.

Children were seen as physical entities devoid of rationality, even more akin to the animals than women, and requiring harsh measures for their training and ultimate growth in “reason.” It was not unlikely that under such auspices men would be assigned the duty of exercising control over women as they did over children, and that included corporal punishment. At a time when a man, seriously pursuing Christian perfection, did not hesitate to lash his own flesh to bring it into subjection, it was unlikely he would refrain from doing so in the case of a headstrong wife.   It is within the memory of many of us that it was generally accepted, by both women and men, that a husband’s (the word itself came from the care of animals) responsibility included the physical discipline of his wife.

From the identification of slaves, women and children with irrational matter and the underside of human life, the kinds of work assigned to them came to be infected with the same denigration and disdain. Since they were sub-human, like animals, the tasks they were given to perform were “servile:” menial, unthinking, unworthy of the energies of a free male “rational spirit.” Thus there developed a distinction between labor that was servile and labor that was not. Not surprisingly, servile labor was manual labor, strenuous, repetitive, and having to do with those aspects of life distasteful to most people — our bodily needs. Field and farm labor along with kitchen work to this day are considered the most menial of occupations regardless of the fact that we are all totally dependent on the product of their labor for our very existence. So much for the market theory of value.

Blue collar / white collar

These distinctions are with us still. And they are reflected in the levels of remuneration, the prerogatives and conditions of work at each level and the social respect accorded to the persons who are associated with each kind of work. A wage slavery as we have today in the modern world would not exist unless there had pre-existed another, more primitive slavery, which had already established the norms and expectations of the labor performed by the worker and the quality of his humanity. Ancient Mediterranean slavery melded seamlessly into feudal agricultural serfdom and then into industrial wage slavery because the last is merely the evolved form of the first.   All stem from the same erroneous premises: that there are two “things” out there, spirit and matter, and spirit has value and matter does not. The strenuous labor associated with the unavoidable subjection of human organisms to their material needs — food, clothing, shelter, self-defense, and the survival labor required to continue to exist — was despised and segregated, assigned to those considered of little worth and most dispensable, in order to free up the elite rational spirits among us for the work that is truly human: the work of the mind and the spirit. Thus the elite were those who worked with their mind and their mouth, and never with their hands.

The abasement of the “servile” laborer in our western “Christian” societies is as universal and unchanging as it is contradictory and incomprehensible to the premises adduced to explain it. The “good news” announceed by Jesus did not disparage working people. The structural inequalities taken for granted in countries whose systems were shaped by Western Christianity is clear evidence that “Christian” influences other than the gospel were at work. The fact is that a seriously corrupted version of Jesus’ message came to dominate among his second century followers in the lands of the ancient Mediterranean. A distorted Christianity flourished there precisely because the nature of its corruption was a fatal accomodation to the social values and religious assumptions of the Roman Empire, which included not only the institution of slavery but, more importantly its spiritist justifications. Constantine’s choice of Christianity was an indicator of how thorough that accomodation had already become before 312.

Feudal and then Mediaeval class structures set the functioning inequalities of the ancient world in legal concrete in the form of an inherited aristocracy because, in large measure, the Church had “baptized” them through its embrace of Platonic spiritism. Applied to its own institutions, matter-spirit dualism created class distinctions between clergy and people and even in the monasteries ascetical egalitarianism succumbed to the realities of class. The educated, often ordained monk’s “work” in the scriptorium copying manuscrupts and in the chanting of the office was kept separate from the hard labor of the illiterate “lay brothers” who toiled in the fields, foundries, workshops, laundries, kitchens and refuse management of the monastic enterprise. The origin of the iconic Catholic Rosary was the substitution of 150 “Hail Marys” in place of the 150 psalms that the working “brothers” were not permitted to pray. The distinction lasted into our times.

A sea change in perspective

This overview of the traditional meaning of work for human / Christian fulfillment may serve as a prolegomenon to a new understanding of reality ushered in by modern science. It is remarkable how damaging it is to apply a distortion of such wide import as spiritism (traditionally called idealism), mis-labeled as dualism, to all of reality. It accomplished the vilification of matter, and assured the self-loathing of the human individual, the subjugation of women, the brutalization of children, the disdain for manual labor and the abasement of the laborer institutionalized in a two class system that despite disclaimers is with us to this day.

What happens when we include the advances of modern science in our thinking? Science has discovered that all of reality, whether in the form of particles or force-fields, and regardless of its level of structural and operational complexity, is comprised of a homogeneous material energy that first and fore­most is responsible for being-here, existing. To be, in other words, far from being spirit, is to be matter. This turns the ancient world with its assumptions, values and prejudices on its head. Work is no longer a sign of our disgrace and shame, to be avoided whenever possible and relegated to those considered less-than-human. Work is the natural survival activity of all organisms made of matter. Work is the primary manifestation of the conatus, the innate engine of our existential bearing. Work is the primary expression of the presence of LIFE.

[1] David Reynolds, “The Slave Owners’ Foreign Policy” NY Review of Books, vol LXIV, No 11, June 23, 2017, p.51

Reflections on Catholic Revisionism: Garry Wills’ “Why Priests”?


 Gary Wills is trying to save Catholicism.

But not the way you might think.  Prospective readers of Why Priests? might see in the provocative title a veiled reference to the sexual abuse by priests and the hierarchy’s cover-up, so prominent in the news these days.  But the book, in fact, is not about priestly behavior.  At best the scandals are background for Wills’ real agenda: a general theological revision that leaves what  he believes are Catholic fundamentals intact while justifying the transition to a more convivial religiosity and representative government within the Catholic Church.

By “revision” I don’t mean to trivialize the depth of institutional reform that Wills study contemplates.  He is calling for nothing less than the categorical elimination of priesthood.  Perhaps a better word than “revise” for what he is doing would be “re-envision.”  If the changes he suggests were implemented, it would in fact be institutionally revolutionary, for it would mean the end of the Catholic caste system, setting priests apart from the laity based on their magical powers.  If it were up to Wills, the Ancien Regime Catholique would be over.  What Locke’s philosophy was to Jeffersonian democracy, perhaps his own theology might be to future Catholic forms of governance and religious practice.

But the effort still deserves the word “revision,” for it leaves “Catholic fundamentals” in place.  It does not directly attack Catholic dogmatic and moral absolutes or the sacred autocracy that sustains them.  Neither of those foundational features of Catholicism depends on “priesthood” for its justification.  They rest on the claim of the divinity of Jesus — the “Incarnation” — and that is something Wills does not dispute.

For those who believe that the problem with the Church can be exhaustively identified as the blow–back from a hydraulic view of the sacraments, a hierarchical male caste system, mandatory priestly celibacy and mediaeval papist authoritarianism, Wills’ book is just what the doctor ordered.  What we may all need to be reminded of, however, is that it has all been done before: it was called the Protestant Reformation.  And it had exactly the opposite effect on the Catholic Church from what the reformers intended; in fact it caused a violent defensive recoil that cast in concrete the worst features of Roman Catholic religious life.  The door was nailed shut at the Council of Trent 25 years after Luther’s protest at Wittenberg.   And even though since then Catholics have been living side by side with the very reformed Christianity that Wills calls for, it has done nothing but intensify their desire to cling to their unreformed “catholicity.”

In our own times, some of these “protestant” changes suggested by Wills’ theological study were encouraged (though not mandated) by the Second Vatican Council, 50 years ago.  Since then, an almost predictable backlash on the part of the Vatican authorities fundamentally repeated the reactions of Trent.  While a significant minority within the Church has criticized the Popes for their systematic unraveling of the visionary tapestry woven by the Council Fathers, it seems clear that the sacred authority and dogmatic absolutism that defines the Catholic hierarchy, setting Catholicism apart from all other religious institutions, remain firmly in place, unaffected by great numbers of defections.  Autocratic authority structures and doctrinal absolutes are the bedrock identifiers of this ancient Church; and the absence of democratic participation in governance means the Church has come to be equated solely with the hierarchy who also control its considerable corporate wealth.

Wills’ reforms are aimed at institutional changes that would make the Church indistinguishable from many of the protestant denominations that still flourish today.  At a time when the Catholic Church is more and more assimilated to a large business corporation whose stock-in-trade is private education, the focus of its managers on “brand recognition” requiring the maintenance of characteristics clearly recognizable as “Catholic” is quite explicit.[1]  Theology has nothing to do with it.  A prospective investor should be reassured that the institutional Catholic Church will resist any changes that would adversely affect its marketability.  This does not argue against the accuracy of Wills’ study or the validity of his recommendations, but it does suggest that there is little chance they will have any effect


Despite what I believe are his ultimate practical intentions, Wills’ chosen means are theoretical: historical and theological.  That means that Why Priests? could as easily be read as a direct foray into the theory of redemption.  The book is an attempt at a serious contribution to Christian self-under­stan­ding and should not be treated merely as an episode in the polemic between the current factions of internal Catholic politics.  It is in the common quest for historical accuracy and theological depth that the following critique is offered.

Wills’ primary thesis is that the priesthood was not an original Christian institution nor religious theme.  This is scripturally and historically incontestable.  In fact sacrifice itself — the raison d’etre for priesthood — as the traditional expression of worship in the ancient Mediterranean, was not part of Jesus’ message.  Jesus never claimed to be the “Victim” destined to save humankind or the Cosmos.  He neither identified himself as a priest nor did he confer priesthood on others.  Moreover, the earliest Christian communities show no signs of ritual practices that included “sacrifice.”  Christian leaders presided over communal meals with prayers and exhortation but the rituals were not “sacrifice,” they were eucharistía, “thanksgiving,” and those who led them were not priests.  In fact, Wills claims, the meals were not even primarily re-enact­ments of the last supper but rather the living symbols of Christian sharing.  He supports all this with extensive citations from the New Testament and early Church documents, like the Didache.[2]

So where did “sacrifice” and “priesthood” come from?  Wills lays the “blame” squarely on the one document in the NT that uses sacrifice and priesthood as the central metaphors for the Christ-event.  That is the letter of pseudo-“Paul” to the Hebrews.  This letter, like the entire Pauline corpus, is based on the assumption that the transcendent significance of Jesus for the world was not his life and message but rather his death and resurrection.  That is the only reason why the author of “Hebrews,” who in all other ways — theological perspective, analytical procedures and literary style — is clearly not Paul, could ever have been so identified:

It is often said that Saint Paul’s Letter to Hebrews is not Paul’s, not a letter, and not to Hebrews. It cannot be by Paul, since basic Pauline concepts are not in it, and its concepts are not in Paul (especially the idea that Jesus is a priest).  Moreover, its language is not that of Paul or of any other author in the New Testament.  Its style and vocabulary are unparalleled.  Its uses of sentence structure and rhetorical devices are far more polished than those found anywhere else.[3] …  As Raymond Brown asks, “Why would the author compose in elegant Greek a dissuasive to Jewish Christian priests who would have known Hebrew as part of the liturgy, or to Jewish Christians of Judea, for whom Hebrew or Aramaic would have been a native language?” Koester agrees: “Hebrews was written in Greek using a Greek form of the Old Testament, which does not seem fitting for an audience of Hebrew-speaking Christians based in Jerusalem”?[4]

What about its antiquity?  New Testament documents are accepted as reliable witnesses to the early faith because they were written while the apostles were still alive.  Wills admits, “The letter had to be written before the nineties of the Common Era, since it is quoted and paraphrased in Clement of Rome’s letter of that date … this puts the Letter sometime in the eighties — approximately when the Gospels of Matthew and Luke were written.”[5]

So it is an extremely early document, earlier possibly than Matthew’s gospel which many scholars assign to the ‘90’s, and much earlier than “John” which came even later.  Despite the anti­quity of Hebrews and its final inclusion in the canon, the fact that it was not universally accepted as canonical from the beginning, probably because it was known not to have been of Pauline or apostolic origin, allows Wills to get a foot in the door.  His case against “sacrifice” and “priest­hood” as validly Christian categories includes the insinuation that there is something questionable about Hebrews as an authentic document with apostolic authority.

I feel Wills is grasping at straws here.  Hebrews was never questioned as to its very early date nor its consonance with the Christian vision of the significance of Jesus.  Regardless of the doubts regarding Pauline authorship due to style and thematic differences with other letters, no one ever challenged the sincerity of the author’s claims to personal acquaintance with Timothy, placing him firmly in apostolic times.  Wills may not like it, but Hebrews, regardless of authorship, represents an undeniably authentic imagery used, known and admired in the very early Church.

Does that obviate his argument that “sacrifice” and “priesthood” did not exist in early Christian communities?  Not at all.  The two issues are separate.  “Hebrews” was a sermon given at a time of looming persecution.  Thinking of Jesus’ death and the possible death of Christians meta­phorically as a “sacrifice” offered by  “priests” was quite compatible with a community of equals.  There is no indication that the epistle was speaking about current structures or practice.  It was poetry.  I feel Wills is railing at a literary and homiletic device as if it had been intended as de fide definita dogma — a quasi-scientific thesis of philosophical theology — a projection based on his own misplaced literalism.

His trenchant criticism, on pp. 145-146, of the letter’s “illogical” attempt to match Jesus “sacrifice” to the details of an imagined Melchizedekian priesthood, is a case in point.  Wills’ censure only makes sense if you insist that the author meant it literally.  It seems obvious to me that the whole train of thought was intended figuratively from the start.  Every analogy limps.  There was never any intention of instituting priesthood, nor “sacrifice” for that matter.  What Wills should be doing instead of punching at these shadows is defending the document for what it was meant to be — a powerful sermon based on an extended metaphor — and thus illuminate the metaphorical and poetic nature of New Testament documents in general.  Wills, and other “theologians” like him, need to be instructed in religious reality:  New Testament documents were poetry not science, just as religion is a love relationship, not a business contract or formulas of eternal “truth.”

Hebrews was an exhortation to Christians to remain steadfast in the face of persecution.  Its evocation of “sacrifice” and the imagery of Jesus as “priest” was meant to inspire its readers.  “Sacrifice” was not adduced as some metaphysical reality.  There was nothing directly dogmatic going on here.  The “sermon” might have been used by later generations to provide a metaphysical justification for a caste priesthood, but it was not intended that way nor was it the source of it.  For that we have to look elsewhere.


We all know that the shared meal of the early communities eventually became the “mass,” considered a “sacrifice” offered by “priests” as a ritual repetition of Jesus’ “sacrifice” on the cross.  That transformation is an undeniable fact.   How did it happen?  Wills’ analysis myopically focuses on the epistle to the Hebrews to the exclusion of other factors.   He omits the historical context: the political, social, economic and religious world of the Roman Empire in the first three centuries ce.

A nascent religious movement like Christianity, driven by apocalyptic energies making a transition from one culture to another was necessarily engaged in a street-level struggle for institutional survival.  Jesus was a Jew and Christianity began as a messianic sect within Judaism.  Its original categories were Jewish and its authorities were the traditional Jewish sources of Torah: the Bible and the oral tradition.  The spectacular success of Christianity in the Greco-Roman cultural milieu, spearheaded by Paul and others, required the delicate “transplanting” of this Semitic Palestinian phenomenon onto Greco-Roman soil.  That meant not only the translation of terms, religious imagery and concepts, but it meant Christians living with their “pagan” neighbors in ways that were seen by them as acceptable even if not completely understood.

The Roman Empire has been called a theocracy.  That’s not quite accurate; every form of government in those days was a theocracy.  Life was inconceivable outside of the will of the gods.  Whatever government a people had, it was really the gods that ruled: they rewarded and punished, they sent harvests or famines, they gave victory in war or they punished with defeat.  Part of the job of every government was to placate the gods and ensure the well-being of the land.  The principal instrument for that, used since time immemorial by all peoples everywhere, by Jews as well as gentiles, was sacrifice. 

“Sacrifice” needs no elucidating from me.  Whole libraries have been written by anthropologists on the origins and evolution of sacrifice in human history.  What may have begun as human sacrifice came to be considered barbaric; at some point a transition was made to animal sacrifice which, at the time Christianity was born, was the universal practice throughout the Mediterranean world.  The very word “redemption” in our tradition had its origins in the ancient Hebrew custom of offering the “first-born” of every living thing (including people) and the first fruits of every harvest to “God.”  People would then “buy back” (redeem) their children from the priests for a price.  It was a ritual fiction that preserved the vestiges of the ancient offering and simultaneously provided a sustenance for the priests.[6]

In the Greco-Roman world of the first century, animal sacrifice offered to the traditional pantheon of Mediterranean gods was an official state function.  Other religions like the mysteries of Demeter, Isis and Mithra — and Christianity would have been considered one of these — were more private matters and existed alongside the official cult of the gods with their temples and official priesthood maintained by the state.  Sacrifice was a public responsibility in which all were expected to participate even the devotees of other religions.  It was a display of reverence for the gods on the part of the whole people.  We are well reminded that the word “liturgy” comes from a Greek word leitourgía:

At Athens the leitourgía was the public service performed by the wealthier citizens at their own expense … The meaning of the word liturgy was then extended to cover any general service of a public kind.  In the Septuagint it is used for the public service of the temple.  Thence it comes to have a religious sense as the function of the priests, the ritual service of the temple.  In the New Testament this religious meaning has become definitely established.[7]

The world the early Christians shared with the “pagans” was not godless and devoid of religion; just the opposite.  And the expression of the official state religion was animal sacrifice.  For those familiar with Christianity’s Judaic roots, there was nothing strange about animal sacrifice or the prestigious office of priesthood that performed those rituals.  The Jewish annual animal sacrifices and the title of priest mirrored the official rituals sponsored by the Roman state.  The epistle to the Hebrews tapped into that familiarity.

In such a milieu, it would be surprising if “gentile” Christians would not be inclined to continue to express their new faith in the terms to which they were accustomed, which came from their ancestral religions, and which continued to be the universal custom of their extended families, neighbors and community.  “Sacrifice” was normal to the world they lived in — a political and social and not just a religious responsibility — a “natural” way to worship “God” and insure the well-being of the community.  Hence, long before the emperors’ selection of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman State, there was an inevitable drift toward accommodation with the religious categories and customs of the Greco-Roman world.  In this light, “Hebrews” would represent an example of the attempt to acculturate Christians with a background in the Old Testament to the predominant “sacrifice” genre of the Greco-Roman world.  In other words, instead of causing the entrance of the “sacrifice” and “priesthood” categories into the Christian theological lexicon, I believe that “Hebrews” was actually the effect of their predominance in the Greco-Roman social environment.  “Hebrews” was an acknowledgement that “sacrifice” and “priests” were part of everyday reality and it gave them a Christian interpretation.   Where Christians differed from “pagans” was not on the question of “sacrifice” but what god they were willing to worship.  It was the Christian refusal to honor the gods of Rome that the authorities feared would bring disaster upon the land.  The Caesars launched persecutions against the Christians as part of their responsibility to protect the Empire.

This accommodation to “sacrifice” would naturally coincide with the social stratifications that characterized Mediterranean society.  The class divisions that set the educated and wealthy elite above artisans and slaves displaced the original Christian egalitarianism.  Authority positions were “appropriately” given to upper class personnel and a two tier caste system developed.  Once “sacrifice” became the preferred category for the interpretation of Jesus’ death and the worship of the community, the bishop, as the one leader of the community,  became the archierus, “high priest,” and his adjutant presbyteroi, “elders” functioned under him.  (Our English word “priest” derives etymologically from presbyter.)

I believe this transition was already well under way when Constantine, aware of the general conformity of Church structures to the life and customs of the Roman people, decided to govern under the aegis of the Christian “God.”  The cross was the “sign” that gave him the victory in 312 that made him emperor.  Although the Church did not become the official religion of the empire until 380, Constantine operated as if it were. He gave state religious functions over to the Christians, along with the priests’ stipends, temples and basilicas with their treasures.

With Constantine’s legalization of Christianity, not to mention the enormous imperial financial support, the building of churches veritably exploded in the course of the fourth century. … One can get some sense of the extravagance of the imperial donations from the list of gifts to the Lateran basilica in the Liber Pontificalis. For example, Constantine gave seven altars of finest silver each weighing 200 pounds, seven gold patens each weighing 30 pounds, two censers of finest gold each weighing 30 pounds.  And this is not even a fraction of the gifts that are enumerated for this building alone.[8]

Constantine intervened in Church disputes over authority and control of property within two years of his accession as emperor and even sent legions to North Africa to forcibly quash the Donatist rebellion a full century before Augustine joined the fray.

Constantine summoned a council of bishops from the western provinces of the empire at Arles on Aug. 1, 314, and again Caecilian was upheld (against Donatus) and his position strengthened … .  Despite further appeals by Donatus and his supporters, Constantine gave a final decision in favor of Caecilian in November 316.  The schism did not die out.  Persecution from 317 to 321 failed, and in May 321 Constantine grudgingly granted toleration to the Donatists.[9]

No sooner had the emperor selected Christianity, than he began shaping it to his will.  it was Constantine himself who, despite not being baptized, and remaining a priest of the Mithraic divinity Sol Invictus all his life, called all the world’s bishops to his private villa in Nicaea in 325 to conduct an Ecumenical Council to settle the question of the divinity of Christ.  And he was no silent observer.  It didn’t take long before the bishops found themselves at an impasse and …

It was at this stage Constantine dropped his bombshell on the Council.  He suggested that the relation of the Son to the Father might be expressed by the word “homoousios,” of one essence.  Eusebius is explicit that the emperor himself proposed this term …[10]

When Christians were given the task of replacing the official “state religion” with their own, many features of what became the standard Roman ritual assumed their character from the pagan liturgies they had to replace.  The “sacrifice of the mass” in the Roman Rite is an example we are all familiar with.  What had originally been a meal shared by equals seated around a common table, ended up being a stylized dramatic event performed by a “priest,” facing an “altar,” conspicuously set apart from and with his back to the people, offering a “sacrifice” designed to “please God.”

This turned the eucharist into the imitation of a pagan animal sacrifice.  The prayer attitudes and relational imagery of each kind of ritual are poles apart, and the differences in the way you relate implies a difference in the character of “God.”  A meal is a natural symbol of the convivial sharing of a community of equals.  That such a community action was then called eucharistía, “thanksgiving, reflects the religiously radical nature of Jesus’ vision and the “God” he worshipped.  It suggests that for Jesus the kind of “God” that would require “sacrifice” does not exist.  Jesus’ “Father,” according to the first letter of John, is irrepressible creative LIFE that has existed “from the beginning” and expresses itself in love.  In Jesus’ message there are none of the attitudes of “sacrifice”:  no fear, no notion of appeasement, no placating an angry potentate, no special caste of men who mediate for us … and forgiveness is assumed.  That is the invitation of Jesus … that is what he meant by religion.[11]

Wills seems to agree; he attacks the very notion of “sacrifice” as unChristian.  Locked into the literalism that characterizes Catholic theology, Wills cites Augustine on the gross impossibility that the “Father” could ever be literally pleased by the death of his “Son.”  He is absolutely right.  Following the striking poetry of the prophetic verses in Psalm 40:

Burnt offerings and sin offerings

             Thou hast not required

Then I said “Lo, I come;

             In the roll of the book it is written of me;

My delight is to do thy will, O my God;

             Thy law is within my heart.”[12]

… the crucifixion as “sacrifice” was understood as a metaphor for obedience and surrender to God.  And that is precisely the way Hebrews presents it in chapter 10: 5-10 and why the author quoted that psalm.[13]  But its metaphoric nature got lost in a world dominated by pagan sacrifice and the literalisms of philosophical theologians like Augustine of Hippo.  In his rush to eliminate “sacrifice” as the basis of priesthood, Wills fails to recognize that well before Anselm of Canterbury blood sacrifice was justified on other grounds, and by Augustine himself.

But Wills is right in saying that “sacrifice” was not Jesus’ way of relating to “God.”  And I agree that literal “sacrifice” and an ordained “priesthood” should have no place in a community that claims to follow Jesus’ “way.”  But Wills has to face the historical facts.  Ritual “sacrifice” as “worship” and probably its attendant priesthood has been with Christianity from at least the beginning of the third century if not earlier, and two centuries later Augustine provided a sophisticated theological justification for maintaining the practice.


 Augustine of Hippo was a bishop and theologian from North Africa whose work of over 40 years spanned the turn of the century after Constantine.  Augustine died in 430.  He had converted to Christianity three years after it had been decreed the official religion of the Roman Empire by the emperor Theodosius in 380.  By that time the Church was no longer known as Christian, but “Catholic” which meant “official,” the religion of the “whole people.”  What Augustine thought and wrote at that crucial moment dominated European religious ideas for 1500 years.   No one has been more influential in our cultural heritage and in forming the western personality.

How should we characterize Augustine’s thought?  I believe it’s his capacity for what I call, after Orwell, “double-think” — the ability to separate “God’s” subjective intentions from “God’s” objective behavior.   Here’s an example: If there is one idea which pervaded all of Augustine’s thinking it is the absoluteness of “God.”  All-powerful, all-knowing, infinitely good, infinitely inscrutable, this “God” was totally in charge — not unlike a Roman emperor.  Nothing happened without his knowledge and acquiescence.  There was only one “God;” he had no rivals, he had no limits, and he loved us each with a personal love that Augustine was convinced he could feel directing his own life.  He applied this premise to issue after issue with relentless consistency.

But this belief was countered by a background “doctrine” that was an unstated, almost subliminal part of his philosophical (neoplatonic) inheritance.  That was that there was an objective order — in reality an emanation of the very inner nature of “God” as being and truth and ruled by logic — to which “God” himself was inescapably bound.[14]  This logic went beyond “love” (taken in its ordinary subjective sense of preference); Augustine’s loving “God,” since he was not arbitrary and whimsical, was bound by this natural order and had to “work within it.”  This “principle” was given such priority by Augustine that, as we shall see, it fatally compromised the omnipotence and compassion of “God.”  The attempt to explain how the two concurred was “double-think.”

Let’s look at another example: Augustine claimed that because of original sin humankind was radically incapable of doing good, or even wanting to do good, without the miraculous grace of “God.”  To the accusation that this implied that human nature was created defective, he answered that ”God” made humankind good, but that Adam’s sin corrupted us fatally.  By artificially separating the original creation as imagined in the Genesis myth from the actual “creation” of the human organism here and now, Augustine claimed he was still being faithful to the fundamental goodness of creation, when he was actually doing the opposite.  He said humankind was born thoroughly corrupt, morally impotent and alienated from “God.”  That the goodness and omnipotence of “God” were being undermined in such a vision seemed to pass without notice.

*  *  *

What does all this have to do with Wills and “sacrifice”?  Wills correctly disputes “sacrifice” as a valid Christian category justifying priesthood.  He bases his opinion on the spirit of Jesus’ message and the evidence of the overwhelming majority of NT documents.  I have no argument with him there.  The problem I have is that he calls on Augustine to testify against this patently outrageous “sacrifice” theory of redemption when in fact Augustine, applying his creative mechanism of “double-think,” did as much as anyone to set it as bedrock in Catholic thinking.

Wills cites multiple places where Augustine formally repudiates the literal sense that Jesus’ death pleased “God.”  But what he doesn’t talk about is that for Augustine this same “God” was so bound by the objective order of “justice” that he not only “devised” the death-by-crucifixion of Jesus to repair it, but will send even innocent new-born infants to eternal conscious torment in hell if they die without being included in that repair … precisely because they remain outside the objective order of justice.  With Jesus’ death, “God,” who is obliged to sustain nature’s universal order, finds a way to satisfy the demands of justice while at the same time “saving” humankind from being totally destroyed.  This “two birds with one stone” effect is achieved by Jesus (“God”) voluntarily taking our place for the punishment (death) that we deserve for sin:

… the universal Church daily cries in prayer to God, “Forgive us our debts,” and they are forgiven us by means of that singular sacrifice for sins which the apostle, speaking according to the law, did not hesitate to call “sin.” Whence, moreover, is that much plainer passage of his, … “We beseech you in Christ’s stead to be reconciled to God. He made Him to be sin for us, who had not known sin; that we might be the righteousness of God in Him.” …  But this passage, where God is said to have made Christ Himself “sin,” who had not known sin, does not seem to me to be more fittingly understood than that Christ was made a sacrifice for sins, and on this account was called “sin.”[15]

Augustine says “Jesus was made a sacrifice” but it wasn’t “God” he was satisfying; it was the objective order of justice.”  “God” is officially off the hook; he simply carries out the sentence imposed by the natural order. The strange thing is that Wills attributes this “theory” to Anselm of Canterbury.[16]  I beg to differ.  The thinking is quite prominent in Augustine, as the citations in this section will show, and I remain thoroughly perplexed as to why Wills insists on claiming that “Augustine rejected Anselm’s argument seven centuries before it was made.”[17]  Wills, I’m afraid, is mistaken here; Augustine did no such thing.  Anselm put it in mediaeval Teutonic terms, but it was Augustine’s argument.  Whatever differences Wills thinks he sees between them is entirely due to disregarding the metaphysics of Augustine’s view and falling for the superficial justifications of his “double-think.”  Anselm, as he did in all areas, fundamentally reproduced Augustine’s theory of redemption.

As he himself [Anselm] repeatedly said, his only ambition was to restate what his master Augustine had already stated.  And that is exactly what he did.  Moreover, Anselm was so thoroughly convinced of the validity of Augustine’s method that its most perfect definitions are to be found in the writings of Anselm rather than in those of Augustine.[18]

For Augustine, Jesus’ saving “sacrifice” is made available to human beings uniquely and exclusively through individual incorporation into the “body of Christ” in baptism.  Hence, anyone, innocent or not, even newborn babies, if they die without being baptized, are punished eternally because they were still part of Adam who was outside the objective order of “God’s” justice.  Augustine was not talking about subjective “moral” behavior here, neither on the part of the innocent infant nor the infinitely loving “God.” He was talking about an objective order, a kind of metaphysical / juridical state which “God” himself had to deal with and by which the unbaptized had to be damned.  The same mechanism that obligated “God” to send babies to hell, also impelled “God” (in the person of Jesus) to die in our stead for the sin of Adam — a death to which we were all condemned.

The following citations come from the same booklet of Augustine written about 420 called “A Treatise Against Two Letters of the Pelagians.” It was intended to refute what Julian of Eclanum had written to Pope Innocent I in defense of Pelagius.  Augustine says,

Nor do you [Pelagians] regard what is written, “Whosoever believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he who believeth not shall be condemned.” …  if you are forced by the words of the gospel to confess that infants departing from the body cannot have either life or salvation unless they have been baptized, ask why those who are not baptized are compelled to undergo the judgment of the second death, by the judgment of Him who condemns nobody undeservingly, and you will find what you do not want,—original sin![19]

Augustine obviously believes that because of original sin unbaptized infants deserve divine condemnation and that such punishment is entirely compatible with both the moral innocence of the children and the “loving” character of “God.”  This is “double think” at its best.  Just so there is no mistake, listen to Augustine again a short time later in the same treatise making himself perfectly clear:

… the venerable Innocent [Pope from 401 to 417] … writes that infants who are not baptized cannot have life. And who will deny that, as a consequence, they have death, if they have not life?  Whence, then, in infants, is so wretched a penalty as that, if there is no original fault?  …  certainly, since by the letters of the venerable Innocent concerning the abode of infants in eternal death unless they were baptized in Christ, the antiquity of the catholic faith shone forth, …  Because the catholic faith does not say that the nature of man is bad in as far as he was made man at first by the Creator; nor now is what God creates in that nature when He makes men from men, is evil; but what he derives from that sin of the first man.[20]

Please note the final sentence.  “God” is absolutely not to be blamed for humankind being born with original sin (and going to hell); Adam’s sin was a moral lapse that resulted in a metaphysical collapse and “God” was powerless in the face of its train of effects.  “God” was forced to continue to create humans contaminated with original sin.  And if “God” wanted to repair this broken system, “God” was also constrained by the universal order of justice, following a calculus imposed by the juridical principle of laesa majestas,[21] to die, as the Second Person of the Trinity, in the place of humankind — for our punishment was death and it had to be paidThus was “sacrificial death” redefined as voluntary and justified.  Augustine’s application of his extraordinary “double think” mechanism authorized what was otherwise a patent contradiction of the absolute omnipotence and providential control of an infinitely loving “God.”

Augustine’s “solution” borrowed its dynamics from Roman Law.  In the Roman system the law was treated as if it had “force” and it created personal conditions or “states” like innocent or guilty or debtor or enslaved that were treated as if they were quasi physical for the purposes of adjudication.  They were legal fictions, of course, but Augustine considered the case of “Adam’s guilt” to be physically / metaphysically literal because the effects of the “state of sin” were clearly manifest in human bodies that were wracked with “concupiscence.”  “Concupiscence” proved we were guilty; guilt demanded punishment.  Those in the “state” of guilt could only be released from that state by paying what they owed.  In this case it was “death” (announced by “God” in Genesis itself) and it had to be paid.  Jesus paid it for us.

Imagine yourself in the Roman Empire where life was ruled by law.  No one could suspend the law except the lawgiver, who was the emperor.  A good emperor who made good laws, would never waive them for it would disrupt the established order, risk the loss of control and inevitably be unfair to someone.  So the emperor, who was called “father” by his subjects, might suffer intensely for the pain he was causing his “children” by allowing the full force of the law to be applied.  Notice that “God” is passive here; the “law” — the order of justice and its punishments — had its own energy.  It was the law that sent non-baptized infants to hell, and required that Jesus die; it wasn’t “God.”  The “cleverness” and compassion of “God” was on display, however, in Jesus’ initiative.  “God,” (Jesus) voluntarily took the place of condemned humankind and died in our stead.  Thus, “choosing” the death of Christ was not sadistic, but an act of heroic love; it paid the debt that was owed by the guilt of Adam’s sin:

 … should the death of Christ not have come to pass?  Nay, rather, why should not that death itself have been chosen above all else to be brought to pass, to the passing by of the other innumerable ways which He who is omnipotent could have employed to free us; that death, I say, wherein neither was anything diminished or changed from His divinity, and so great benefit was conferred upon men, from the humanity which He took upon Him, that a temporal death, which was not due, was rendered by the eternal Son of God, who was also the Son of man, whereby He might free them from an eternal death which was due? … Therefore “God commends His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified in His blood, “we shall be saved from wrath through Him;” from the wrath certainly of God, which is nothing else but just retribution. For the wrath of God is not, as is that of man, a perturbation of the mind; but it is the wrath of Him to whom Holy Scripture says in another place, “But Thou, O Lord, mastering Thy power, judgest with calmness.” If, therefore, the just retribution of God has received such a name, what can be the right understanding also of the reconciliation of God, unless that then such wrath comes to an end?[22]

By the end of the fourth century Jesus’ death as a “sacrifice” was already an established Christian practice and religious category that had been absorbed by osmosis from the surrounding culture.  As with infant baptism, Augustine inherited the practice, he did not create it; he was trying to make sense of it.  By elevating Roman juridical categories to the metaphysical level in order to explain Church practice, he made it make sense in those termsHe redefined “God,” man, original sin and redemption along with a host of other doctrines and embedded his interpretative categories in Christian theology for the next 1500 years.  Anselm at the beginning of the twelfth century took Augustine’s theory whole cloth, left out the sugar-side of “double think,” and adjusted it to reflect feudal Teutonic concepts of satisfaction as a substitute for punishment.  Together they denigrated the character of “God,” turning “God” into a punitive monster unwilling to mitigate our punishment, whose main interest was not humankind, but preserving the established order.[23]

The ironic thing is that they associated this vision with the man, Jesus, to whom it was totally foreign.  I blame it all on the very early mistake of his followers, of focusing “salvation” on Jesus’ death and resurrection, rather than on his life and message.  Once you claim we are “saved” by Jesus’ death, there are not many places you can go with it.  The disciples saw “sacrifice” in Isaiah’s “prophesies” of the Suffering Servant, and the Christian vision has been built around that ever since.  However, that was not Jesus’ Jewish message.  In his life, Jesus labored to restore “God’s” reputation as a truly “loving Father” and thus ground human dignity, compassion and freedom which were being hopelessly eroded by a rigid Jewish legalism in reaction to national humiliation under the Romans.  He was murdered for it … end of story — the story of the human condition.[24]  It wasn’t long before Jesus’ reform movement among the gentiles was caught up in the “theism of power” that ruled Rome as the inheritor of the empires which formed our western civilization.  By Augustine’s time, that reversal had already taken root in the practice of the western Church; theocracy had won and Roman Christians were offering “the sacrifice of the mass” to the “one true God” for the health of the emperor and the success of the Roman empire.  Rome had not been “baptized” by Christianity, rather Christianity had been co-opted (“paganized”?) by Rome, and Augustine set it all in theological stone.


 Wills wants to tinker with doctrine and still remain “Catholic.”  That’s the way with revisionists.  I can understand the temptation.  We Catholics cling to our Catholicism with an intensity that reveals the ethnic energies that feed all religious phenomena.  We believed that to abandon it would mean to abandon who we were.  On top of that, we were subjected to a formation that elevated Catholicism to divine status.  For us, the Catholic Church was the very place on earth where “God” himself exclusively resided and infallibly taught eternal truths to his people.

It’s time all this foolishness ended.  The Catholic Church is one organization among many that brokers relationship to the sacred.  It is no more divine than any other religious club and just as prone to superstition and self-serving abuse of power.  We are learning from scripture scholars and historians that the ultimate source of the absolutism that has characterized our Church was not Jesus of Nazareth but the ancient Roman Theocracy — the belief that Rome was divine, diva Roma, — chosen by the gods to rule the earth.  Rome was the Empire; the sole ruler of the known world.  When Rome chose its “church,” it automatically became “the Church,” the religion of “the whole world” — kat’olica.

Wills insists that he is Catholic and takes pains to list the doctrines to which he holds fast; they prove his orthodoxy and guarantee his membership.  Here they are, copied directly from page 256:

But if I do not believe in popes and priests and sacraments, how can I call myself a Catholic? What do I believe? I get that question all the time. Well, I will tell you what I believe. The things I believe are not incidental or peripheral, but central and essential. They are:


The Creation (which does not preclude evolution).

The Trinity.

Divine Providence.


The Incarnation.

The Resurrection.

The Gospels.

The Creed.


The Mystical Body of Christ (which is the real meaning of the Eucharist).

The Eucharist.

The Second Coming.

The Afterlife.

The Communion of Saints.

I notice there is no mention of “Original Sin,” and “Redemption” — a conspicuous omission given the discussions in his book, and no clue as to why.  The “doctrines” that remain on the list are some of the metaphors our western culture has generated to express the mystery of existence.  Other cultures with different histories and different poets have generated other metaphors that focus on the same existential issues, sometimes in ways that are recognizable to us, sometimes not.  Religion is a universal phenomenon because the insecurity of existence — an existence that our flesh is programmed to cling to but which is inexorably moving toward death — is absolutely universal.  Religion will always be with us because of that inherent contradiction: it affects us all, we can’t help it. 

Christianity has never acknowledged that its doctrines and practices are metaphor.  Born in Greece at a time when science in the form of rational philosophy had swept away the pantheon of the gods, Christianity was embraced by the Greeks as the ritual expression of a “scientific” Platonism, and its narratives objective history.  That is still true today.  Garry Wills is a Christian literalist whose critique of the Catholic doctrines of “sacrifice” and “priesthood” is based squarely on challenging their factual authenticity.  He meets literal claims with literal refutations.

Catholic doctrine is, however, pure metaphor, and its practices, structures and rituals, poetry.

Wills does not agree.  For him, it is literal.  When Wills provides us with this list of “what he believes,” he is not saying that this is a list of acceptable metaphors … and that “sacrifice” and “priesthood” are not acceptable metaphors.  Not at all.  He is saying this is a list of “realities,” things that are really, literally “true,” and that “sacrifice” and “priesthood” are not among them,

but the Incarnation is … and the rest of that list of “facts.” 

Take the Incarnation.  If Wills accepts the Incarnation as real in the sense that the Church has traditionally proclaimed it, then he is also saying that Jesus is literally “God” exactly as the “Father” is “God” — homoousios, defined at Nicaea and therefore it was “God” himself who founded the Christian Religion.

How can Catholicism be faulted, then, for drawing the inescapably logical literalist conclusion, a century before Augustine’s time, that “outside the Church there is no salvation”?  You can’t blame logic, it’s only an obedient tool that validates conclusions.  If the conclusion is invalid — and we know it is — it must mean the premise was wrong … incorrect as stated or as understood … not true.  Where does that leave the “Incarnation” … and Wills’ “Catholicism”?

Belief in the literal Incarnation has entailed the “exclusivism” and “infallibilism” of Catholicism that Wills surely rejects.  Catholics are on the horns of a dilemma: if they want to avoid saying that the Catholic Church was founded by “God”-in-person, and to that end declare that the Incarnation is only a metaphor, they stop being Catholic.  On the other hand, if they want to remain Catholic, they have to live with “exclusivism” and “infallibilism” as acceptable conclusions from the premises they support … and just hope and pray that the “Holy Spirit” will deter the authorities from acting on its literalist implications.   But think what that means: it implies that we are praying that the Incarnation not be taken literallty — that it be treated “as if” it were a metaphor!

The contrary to exclusivism, whether as applied to sectarian Catholicism or to all of Christianity, is universalism, i.e.,  a recognition that all religions provide similar metaphorical vehicles for their people.

Is there a middle ground between exclusivism (literalism) and universalism?  I don’t think so.  Doesn’t the realization that even if Christian doctrine like the Incarnation were literally true, that it can only avoid contradictions like “exclusivism” when treated as metaphor, … doesn’t that fact compel acceptance of the poetic nature of religion and therefore, paradoxically, argue for religion’s universal validity?

However you ask it, the question highlights the metaphoric, artistic, non-literal character of the religious phenomenon.  Religion is a work of the imagination, and Wills’ entire study in Why Priests?, by pursuing the question of sacrifice and priesthood in the same literalist terms that philosophical theology has used since the days of Augustine, does a disservice to the evolution of religious thought in our time.  We are learning that religion — all religion — is symbolic, part of the virtual world we create with our heads to override the indeterminacy of life.  Priesthood and sacrifice are historically and regionally conditioned metaphorical expressions of the religious relationship.  But so is Incarnation.  If for some reason I no longer wish to embrace the first two doctrines and still accept the third, I have a perfect right to do so, but not on the claim that one is a “fact” and the others are not.  None of them are “facts.”  They are all metaphors; they are all poetry.  And, yes, we have the right to choose the poetry that inspires us, to listen to the music that expresses our feelings and to surround ourselves with the art and buildings that represent our relationship to that “in which we live and move and have our being.”  But once you admit that, you have entered the universalist dimension because that’s what every religion does.

In our time we are thankfully “beyond religion,” meaning an obligatory imposition of objectively true propositions from and about another world, administered by a social elite which controls our destiny here and hereafter.  But in another sense, today we have finally discovered what religion really is and we have made it ours.  We have entered an era where the power of the religious poetry of millennia of multiple traditions has been made available for the enrichment of us all.   In our time the universal respect for all religions is our celebration of the profound insights and luxuriant expression here­­to­fore denied us by the pre-emptions of our “only true” religions.  Religion is human poetic insight functioning at some of its deepest levels.  We are now learning that religion does not come from “God,” it has been ours from the very beginning; and now we are declaring our rights of ownershipThese are depths that our ancestors reached on their own, and we will not be disinherited.

We are not going back where we came from.  We have entered a universalist age and any religion that earns our loyalty will have to acknowledge that irreversibility, perhaps even in the form of “official” declarations.  Such a universalist proclamation on the part of a newly reformed Catholicism would have to insist not only on the repudiation of its own erstwhile religious arrogance and claims to superiority, but will actively encourage its members to taste and share the poetry, ritual and relational attitudes of other traditions even as we offer to share ours with them.  For Wills to attempt to breathe life back into the moribund corpse of an unrepentant exclusivist sectarian Catholicism by separating “orthodox” from “heterodox” literalisms and bypassing entirely the metaphoric nature of all religious expression, is myopic and atavistic.  Derogating the priesthood and challenging the validity of the doctrine of “sacrifice” on which it rests, however valid, is to my mind, too little, too late and too small.  Wills’ proposals are hardly different from the reforms sought by the Protestants in the sixteenth century.  If those reforms had been embraced by the Church at Trent in 1545, it may have averted the bloody European nationalism and brutal, dehumanizing colonialism that characterized the last 500 years of “Christian” history.  It’s too late for that.  Now is not the time to “revise” Catholicism or even Christianity; it has had its day for good or bad — now is the time to transcend it all.


 Religion is relationship.  Religion is our relationship to our source and sustainer.  Therefore its doctrines can only be poetry, a work of art, a quintessential work of the imagination.

Poetry (in the broad sense) is the tool we have forged to talk about relationship.  It is necessarily inexplicit.  It uses one set of images — words, pictures, music, movements, structures — to evoke another.  And the reason is that the thing it is trying to express is inexpressible: relationship.  Relationship is not definable.  It is not something that can be known “objectively.”  Only persons, subjects, can understand relationship from inside as a valence between subjects, and only persons can try to express it in the strange symbolic form we call poetry.  Relationship cannot be weighed or measured; it has no physical dimensions; it is not predictable as to its birth or consequences, its intensity or its duration.  It is not a “thing” of any kind; it is sustained only in the empty interstices between mutually recognizing and intentionally embracing conscious individuals.

Poetry is symbolic, not literal.  It is metaphoric; it “throws” a word or image “beyond” the boundary line that separates one thing from another and thus evokes, does not define, points to, does not comprehend, suggests, does not declare, something else entirely.  What results is an understanding that comes from a lived experience, not knowledge.  Metaphor is a literally incorrect use of words; yet because it calls forth in the reader a remembrance that reconstructs the subjectivity of relationship, it brings it to life; and if the poetry is good, if the metaphors are good, it will be dead accurate and it will “work.” “Incarnation” can be one of these metaphors;  but it is not a “fact.”

Everything on Wills’ list of orthodoxies is poetry:  God, Creation, Trinity, etc..  They are all metaphors that try to elicit an understanding of a real relationship about which we have no direct know­ledge whatsoever.  We know nothing, but we understand how we are related to the source and sustenance of our existence, in which “we live and move and have our being.”  I know nothing; the only “thing” I know is myself, and I construct a felt relationship to my unknown source out of the inner experience of personal non-origination.  The doctrines do not refer to things that are known but rather inferred and experienced in my unknowing.

 Religion is the attempt to express the awe and mystery of dependent non-self-originating existence.  The irrepressible human “sense of the sacred” spontaneously arises in the awareness of existential vulnerability.  It not just a matter of fear.  The awareness of our undeniable conditionality — that we do not have possession or control over that which is most precious to us, our own existence — generates the empirical base on which the relationship is constructed.   And I want to emphasize, it is a construct, for the only intersubjective experience we have is with ourselves as individuals and as a community.  There is no other world; there is no “supernatural” experience; “God” is where we “live and move and have our being” and that’s right here and now!

Religion is not literalist: it is relational and poetic.  Theology, history, scriptural analysis, on the other hand, are not religion.  They are all literalist enterprises that approximate to the “exact” sciences whose methods they employ.  I do not criticize Wills for making a literalist analysis and coming to literalist conclusions.  I criticize him for not clarifying the difference between the work of the sciences and the work of religion.  Sacrifice and priesthood are metaphors.  Accurately identifying that difference and thoroughly analyzing the relational import of religious metaphors is precisely the work of scientific theology.  Doctrine, on the other hand, is not science, it is religion’s poetry.  Doctrine is not talking about “things,” it is offering evocative imagery that gives shape and intensity to the religious relationship.  Theology is different from doctrine.  The systematic comparison between the doctrinal metaphors of various religious traditions is one of the great contributions that a theologian can make to our universalist age and its potential for religious experience at depths never before imagined.

Theology is not religion and does not substitute for religion, and that was the mistake Augustine made.  He was a Platonist and it is not surprising that he fell into the trap set by Plato who was convinced that if he could merely think something, it must not only be real, literally true, but more than an idea.  It had to be something physical / metaphysical — like a thing or a force, or a state.  We approach things differently in our times.  Unfortunately, Wills’ enthusiasm for Augustine and his “solutions” risks maintaining the illusion that our imaginings are reality … that the lack of independent verification has nothing to say about the validity of religiously held “facts.”  I repeat: there are no such “facts.”  The only fact is an experienced existential crucifixion.  The religious relationship is the resurrection our conatus impels us to project.  I said “impel” not “compel.”  It’s our choice.  We either trust it or we don’t.  That’s the way relationship works.

[1] “Preserving the Vision: Strategic Plan 2011-2014”,” can be found on the Brooklyn Diocesan website (http://dioceseofbrooklyn.org/). The language used in that document reflects this corporate commercial mindset. Cf also John AllenVatican official warns of ‘dialogue of the deaf’ with LCWR,” NCR June 12, 2012, where it’s clear the same terminology was used by a member of the Roman Curia.  Also see Tony Equale, “Preserving the Vision?” blogpost for July 2, 2012 https://tonyequale.wordpress.com

[2] Garry Wills, Why Priests? A Failed Tradition, Viking, 2013, p.17, Chapter 18, pp. 241-253 passim.

[3] Ibid., p. 119.

[4] Ibid., p. 124

[5] Ibid., pp. 122-123.

[6] Gigot, F.  “Redemption in the Old Testament”, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, (1911),  New York: Robert Appleton Company.  Retrieved May 21, 2011 from New Advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12681a.htm

[7] Fortescue, Adrian, “Liturgy,” The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 9, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09306a.htm&gt;.

[8] John Baldovin, SJ, “The Empire Baptized,” in The Oxford History …, op.cit., pp. 78 & 79.

[9] Donatist. 2013. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 19 March, 2013, from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/169009/Donatist (emphasis mine)

[10] A.H.M. Jones, Constantine and the Converson of Europe, Collier Books, NY, 1962 (1948), p.135

[11] These two paragraphs were adapted from Tony Equale, “The Religiosity of the People,” blogpost Jan 3, 2013 www.tonyequale.wordpress.com

[12] Ps 40: 6-9, RSV translation.

[13] Myles Bourke, “The Epistle to the Hebrews,The Jerome Biblical Commentrary, Brown Fitzmeyer Murphy, eds., Prentice Hall, Eglewood Cliffs, NJ, Vol II, ch.61, ¶ 58, p.400,

[14] For more on this, see Tony Equale, Religion in a Material Universe, IED Press, Pamplin VA, 2013, p. 133-4, 144ff.

[15] (Saint) Augustine, Aurelius (2012-02-15). The Works of Saint Augustine, “A Treatise Against Two Letters Of The Pelagians” Bk I, ch 40.  (Kindle Location 172232).

[16] Wills, op.cit. pp. 177-180

[17] Wills, op.cit. p.191

[18] Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, NY, 1938, pp. 23-24, cited in Giles Edward Murray Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury and His Theological Inheritance, Ashgate Pub. Burlington, VT, 2004  p.11

[19] Augustine, op.cit. (Kindle Locations 173175-173184).

[20] Ibid., (Kindle Locations 173402-173412)

[21] laesa majestas (eng.: lese majesty) a crime in a class society where the magnitude of the offense is not determined by the act or the motivation of the perpetrator, but by the “status” (rank, “majesty”) of the one offended.

[22] De Trinitate, Bk XIII, ch 16, ¶21, op. cit. Saint Augustine (Kindle Locations 211860-211877).

[23] Robert Lowry Calhoun, Lectures on the History of Christian Doctrine, Yale Divinity School, New Haven CT, 1948 (class text, mimeographed) p.279-81

[24] For the significance of Jesus’ death in this “one world” scenario, see Tony Equale, Religion in a Material Universe, chapter V, section II on “Redemption,” p. 164ff.